Early in February this year the
Sierra Leone High Court sentenced six individuals to fines and jail
terms in a case in which they had been found guilty of damaging forty
palm trees belonging to the multi-national agro-industrial company,
Socfin. Socfin has established an oil palm plantation and oil mill on
6,500 hectares of land in Pujehun district, Southern Sierra Leone,
leased from the Government of Sierra Leone who in turn purportedly
leased it from
local landowners. The lease arrangements have not been without
controversy. Environmentalists and civil society advocates have
criticized the terms of this and similar deals, and Socfin's operations
in Pujehun have been marred by protests from local landowners unhappy
about the loss of their land and the amount of compensation they have
received.
In the Socfin case, the end product of the Pujehun oil palm plantation
is not a
biofuel, but palm oil for local consumption. Socfin has extensive
rubber and oil palm
plantations in other parts of
Africa and in Asia.
Under the terms of the agreement negotiated with the Government of
Sierra Leone, landowners receive in the region of $2.50 US per acre of
land used by Socfin. The lease term is 50 years, with the company given
an option to extend it for an additional 21 years. In
2013 we took a
long look at Addax,
another large multinational with an agricultural
investment in Sierra Leone. Addax has leased 136,800 acres of land in
northern Sierra Leone for a sugar cane plantation and ethanol
distillery. The terms of the Addax lease are broadly similar to those
of the Socfin lease. In our 2013 analysis we found that the lease rate
(Addax appears to be paying some landowners slightly more than Socfin)
grossly undervalued the land. In September last year the
Stockholm
Environment Institute issued a detailed report into Addax's
operations (currently scaled down). They found considerable merit
in
some of the company's programmes: Addax operates a Farmers
Field School, FFS, to teach farmers modern farming techniques, a Farmer
Development Programme, FDP,
ploughing community fields with sufficient rice for each village and a
Farmer Develpment Services, FDS, to provide inputs to locals at low
cost. Despite all this, the
authors found widespread poverty and were uncertain whether at the end
of the day Addax's presence would make a lasting improvement to the
people's lives:
"One aspect of the Makeni Project that
makes it of particular interest to the international community,
particularly development policy-makers and
practitioners, is the wide range of mitigation measures that ABSL
(Addax) has undertaken in the host communities...if
a project held up as a “model” for sustainable FDI in Africa has such
mixed results, it raises questions about the feasibility of using
agro-industrial FDI to drive rural development in Sierra Leone...good
governance is crucial to achieving sustainable development benefits,
and to ensuring that the rural poor share in those benefits and are not
harmed. Our research suggests that Sierra Leone’s institutions are not
yet up to that task."
Socfin on the other hand appears to have a much narrower view of its
corporate social responsibility than Addax. The map at right, taken
from a 2015
environmental assessment of the company's operations by Environmental
Resources Management shows the affected villages more or less
completely engulfed by the company's plantations. This map alone should
be sufficient evidence to indicate that the affected villagers have
good cause to complain. Amazingly the environmental assessment
candidly
acknowledges (p. 10) that the green areas shown around the villages
"were preserved to be used by the communities for subsistence (my emphasis) farming."
Socfin and Addax are but two of
many large agricultural investments in Sierra
Leone The group Green Scenery, in its 2013 publication Factsheet on Large-Scale Agri-Investments
in Pujehun District, Sierra
Leone reported that an
astonishing 94% of arable land in the district had been leased to nine
investors including Socfin. In 2012 one
of the biggest investments of them all was announced by the government
and China Hainan, a
135,000 hectare rice and rubber plantation stretching over three
districts.
Is all this helpful to Sierra Leone, indeed, since it's a
continent-wide phenomenon, to Africa? Are we about to
see, with these huge investments, a change in the continent's fortunes,
an arousal from slumber? What will likely be the effect of this massive
injection of capital into the African countryside?
The World Bank document cited above, long and wide-ranging, provides
some useful insights. Along the way, it explodes at least a couple of
widely-held assumptions:
(1) Agricultural
Foreign Direct Investment is always, or at least usually, good.Not
neceesarily so, say the authors. And good for whom? Not even always
good for the investing companies, a considerable number of whom, like
Addax Sierra Leone, have run into difficulties. And certainly not good
for the competent small farmer - "Smallholders’
income is 2 times to 10 times what they could obtain from wage
employment only." (p. 83).
(2) Increasing farm
sizes yields greater efficiencies. Mega farms are the most efficient.
Tiny smallholder farms are simply uncompetitive. Not true, say
the authors. It varies from one situation to another, but "there is no strong case to replace
smallholder with large-scale cultivation on efficiency grounds."
(p. 83). "With
a total export volume of 4.6 million t, Vietnam is a major global
exporter and low-cost producer of rice, with an average farm size of
0.5 ha and labor intensive technology." (p. 82)
Low
African yields
Wading through the various documents, one gets the sense that the
agricultural experts are truly baffled at the African rural
predicament. Over 50 years of Independence, through plan after plan
(the World Bank has just announced a new $55million smallholder
initiative in Sierra Leone in conjunction with Britain's DFID), project
after project, theory after theory, nothing seems to have worked.
Agricultural productivity has remained a fraction of what is being
achieved elsewhere. For the last 50 years, the known constraints to
higher African yields - pests, weeds, disease, poor water control, poor
seed management, poor fertility management, lack of access to credit,
inputs, farm machinery and animal traction, shortage of labour - for
the last 50 years these have all been known and addressed by
governments
and international agencies, to little avail. The rice farmers of Asia,
the sugar cane farmers of
Brazil have built massive, new export businesses even as African
farmers have languished. In Latin America soybean production increased
from 33 million tons (t) to 116 million t from 1990 to 2008, making the
region the world’s largest soybean exporter. In
Africa on the other hand, rice imports
have been steadily rising.
Yields in the major African food crops, maize, millet, sorghum, rice
are a
fraction of what they are elsewhere, a huge factor in African rural
poverty. In maize Africa achieves just 20% of potential yield, in
soybeans just 32% (World Bank, p. 130, Table 3.3).
In 2013 Addax's FDP programme in Sierra Leone planted 60
community fields, 1858 ha, with rice, supplying 18,400 local people for
the year, with a yield of 1,155 kg/ha. The estimated yield of the local
people planting on their own farms was 300 kg/ ha. To achieve the same
output they had to use almost four times as much land. Through their
FDP programme Addax really is saying to the local people, to the
government, to all of us, "You really don't need to break your backs
ploughing and sowing all that land to achieve this output."
African agriculture is bedeviled by the bush fallow system,
extraordinarily wasteful of land. Under this system land is planted one
year out of perhaps eight or ten or twelve (the exact number varies).
In the other years the land lies fallow in order to allow it to regain
its fertility. The system might have had its merits in traditional,
sparsely
populated settlements of days long gone, where population pressures
were moderate (wars and disease took a great toll) and contact with the
outside world was minimal, but today bush fallow, and much of the
socio-economic baggage that goes with it, is doomed. In today's
world the system is a major contributor to African poverty. With all
other serious economies making efficient use of their farmland, Africa
can not afford not to do likewise. Internally, with fast-rising African
populations (true,
urban populations are rising faster, but rural
populations are also increasing - according
to Statistics Sierra Leone, rural population in 2004 was over 3
million, approximately 50% greater than the total population at Independence
in 1961) the pressure on the land becomes
greater and greater as more and more people seek to eke out a living
from
the same quantum of land. Without an increase in productivity of the
land, the certain result is continuing reductions in per capita rural
income
and increasing rural poverty stretching out into the forseeable future.
Externally, the competition is, if anything, greater. The rice
farmer
in Burma or Thailand, far more productive than his African counterpart,
can ship his surplus to rice
eaters in West Africausing
transport, communications and banking links far more advanced than they
were even thirty years ago
and with the backing of global agreements such as GATT. In a
global economy where huge
cash flows, made at the click of a button are constantly in search of
viable investments, the lands themselves are increasingly vulnerable.
All other
things being equal farmland that is only producing crops one year in
every ten is worth one tenth the value of land that is being used every
year. The bush fallow system is the basis for extremely low valuations
of land and
enables external multinational companies with the capital and knowhow
to raise crops every year to make seemingly attractive offers for
African farmland. The agri-investor, planting every year, with
higher yields than achieved by the local farmer, can grow ten times the
crop achieved by the villager using bush fallow, earn ten times the
revenue and pay
significant taxes on it to government. This situation has proved
extremely tempting for African governments, not to mention African
chiefs. The land which these
agri-investors are given, seemingly unused African bush, often turns
out to be farmland within the African bush fallow system, setting the
stage for confrontation between investor and local farmer. Such as the
clash on a Socfin plantation that led to the Sierra Leone High Court
case mentioned
at my start.
Who owns
the land?
Much of the debate about the advisability or otherwise of
large
land investments by outside investors centers on two options: should
the status quo,
community-held lands, continue? Or should large corporations be given
free rein to use their economic muscle to tame the African countryside?
Both sides have strong supporters. Environmentalists, nationalists,
civil society activists and some UN
agencies raises their hands in horror as multinationals acquire
traditional lands long worked by rural people. Corporations,
free-traders
and the business-minded maintain that foreign direct investment can
only be for
the good. There is a third option, but it is
without a strong lobby: Transfer legal ownership of the land to
individual local landowners and let them
decide what to do with it.
African agriculture is bedeviled
not only by the bush fallow system but by archaic traditional land
tenure systems. Land is very often held communally, by the entire
village or by large, dispersed, often polygamous families descended
over several generations, without
secure, legal title. Demarcation of land is haphazard at best, without
the benefit of the services of professional surveyors. Control of
family lands is often vested in the eldest male relative, who must sort
out competing claims, and which control passes on his death to the next
in line, often from a different branch of the family. In disputes,
which are not uncommon, the Chief, held to be the custodian of all
lands, arbitrates.
Basic economics, common sense and
long observation all tell us that a man is more likely to make
long-term investments in fixed capital when his title to the land on
which the capital is fixed is secure and he can pass this title at his
death to his chosen successors. Yes,
as the various reports make quite clear, villagers are dirt poor and
are
barely scraping enough together for a daily meal, let alone
long-term capital investment, but might a change in the ownership
structure make
even just a teeny, weeny bit of difference, to be compounded over the
years and decades into something substantial? If he has clear title,
might that farmer possibly make the sacrifice to build that irrigation
channel from the river to his land or dig and maintain that well to be
passed on to his sons? If even he can't afford it, might his brother in
Freetown, with a little cash to spare, be more willing to help him put
up a concrete structure rather than that transient mudbrick one if
title is assured and the farmer can designate his successor? These
little,
private investments, replicated over the country and amplified over the
years, could, just could, become a mighty flood to transform the
country, even the continent.
"As
long as property rights to land and, where necessary water, are well
defined .... productivity- and welfare-enhancing
transactions can occur" (World Bank, p. 82); "If
rights are well defined, if land markets function competitively, and if
information is accessible to all, land prices should ensure that a
mutually satisfying outcome is achieved" (p. 83);
"In Indonesia, limited ability to uphold local rights, together with
free provision of land to large investors, led to processes of area
expansion that caused immense social disruption and environmental
damage." (p. 90) "The
export growth witnessed in countries such as Vietnam, Thailand, and
Peru following a clarification of the property rights system
illustrates the importance of secure property rights." (p. 90)
In addition to private investments on the land, might the banking
system be more willing to give out loans where title is assured? Some,
including the authors of the World Bank report, rule out this
possibility in the forseeable future, but if the objective is
worthwhile, what better time than now to begin working for it?
Given the impenetrability of the African bush, is it feasible to
contemplate surveying an entire continent? Again, if the objective is
worthwhile, what better time than now to begin work on it? Land markets
can not function efficiently if the land is undefined. If, in the fifty
plus years of Independence, surveying had progressed at the rate of
just 1% of total land per year, the job would have been far advanced by
now. Has anything comparable been done before? According to the World
Bank:
"...in
Thailand ... a land titling program was initiated to provide tenure
security and allow land markets to develop. Until 2004, this program
issued 12 million out of a total of 26 million titles countrywide"
(p.70)
"The
potential impact is illustrated by Mexico, which in slightly more than
a decade registered rights to more than 100 million hectares (ha) of
rural ejido land, two-thirds of it managed by communities and one-third
by individuals. Every household receives a certificate to three types
of land: the house plot, one or more parcels of individually cultivated
land (which can be transferred within the community but not to
outsiders unless the whole ejido decides to join the private property
regime), and a proportional share of communal land. This process also
established an open and accountable internal structure for the ejido
that entails a clear separation of powers, supervised by a specially
formed office of the agrarian ombudsman. Mexico’s reforms demonstrate not only
that it is possible to register property rights on a large scale and in
a fairly rapid way, but also that doing so can help to resolve
long-standing conflict on a massive scale. Moreover, there is evidence
that doing so encouraged investment..." (p. 150)
One way or
the other, change is upon us
Whether one likes it or not,
aggressive capitalist interventions like those of Addax and Socfin are
with us to stay, with the support even of cautious international
financing institutions like the ADB and IFC. Even though it's clear
that
the local people's interests are not well served by these agreements,
it's also clear that the local people were using the land terribly
inefficiently in the first place and this is what gives these companies
entree. Today, in our global village, land has become an
internationally traded commodity. Even though
Sierra Leone's archaic land laws prevent or severely restrict buying
and selling of land in the provinces by individuals, villagers
considered too simpleminded to own land outright no matter what the UN
human rights charter says; even though
discriminatory laws today prevent people of the capital owning land in
the provinces, economic disparities and economic opportunities have
become so great that powerful international corporations can bypass red
tape, go to the heart of government and induce transfer of what was
once sacred. And by the nature of these agreements, corporations and
businesses who hold them can in turn sell them on to other interested
entities.
The Sierra Leone countryside, indeed the African countryside,
simply has
to change. There is no other way. African
cities can not continue to
absorb the unemployed or underemployed, the landless and the destitute
of the countryside. The rest of the world is not going to stand
still
and quiet in the face of commercial opportunities in Sierra Leone and
Africa. If there are no internal African adjustments the rest of the
world will continue to grow
food in their own countries more and more efficiently and sell more and
more of it to Sierra Leone and Africa. The rest of the world will look
at the huge, unrealized potential of the African countryside and will
use its vast amassed wealth, to buy African governments and African
chiefs and poverty-stricken African villagers and African lands and
make efficient use of the lands and realize even more profits.
One way
or the other, whether through internally decided, rational adjustment,
whether through trade and investment, whether through
political and economic takeover, whether through demographics, whether
through revolution, change will come.
United Nations bodies and international authorities are normally
extremely cautious in calling for change to traditional rural societies
and social structures. But in today's world, change will come no matter
what you do. The entire world has had to adjust to changes in
technology, in demographics, improvements in health, changes in
governance systems and best practice, vastly expanded trade and
commerce opportunities, advances in agricultural knowledge and
agricultural competition. Huge adjustments have had to be made by all
peoples everywhere. Why should the African countryside be different?