The
Failing States of West Africa – How Long Can They Continue? (part 1) by Paul Conton
It's hard now to imagine the euphoria
of West African Independence. Achieved for the most part without
bloodshed, ahead of the rest of black Africa. The dancing, the
drumming, the singing. The dreams.
Sixty years later all lost in the hard, cold reality of world
competition.
It's just as hard to imagine that only a little more than one hundred
years ago there was no Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast or any
of the other West African states as we know them today. The specifics
of the West African creation were dictated by
the presence of the different European nations and nationals - the
British, the French, the Germans, the Portuguese - in the different
territories.
This artificial construct, now
collectively known as ECOWAS, survived fifty or sixty years
of colonization, and it has now survived a similar period of
Independence amid mounting challenges. My research for this article
began with the
latest UN Human Development Index. Of West Africa's fifteen
nations, eleven, Niger,
Burkina Faso, Guinea,
Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Gambia, Cote d'Ivoire,
Benin and Togo, are in the bottom twenty five countries on the HDI
list. A further two, Senegal and Nigeria, are in the bottom forty one
countries placed by the UN in the Low Human Development category. Just
two, Ghana and Cape Verde, qualify for the Medium Human Development
category. The West African average HDI (0.469) is well below the
average for
sub-Saharan Africa (0.523), revealing that even compared to its black
African
neighbours, West Africa performs poorly.
The UN's HDI uses indicators for health, education and
income to develop a single number and rating
for each country. Notwithstanding their importance, these indicators are not
the only pointers to a nation's success or failure. One could also look
at, among others, infrastructural development,
environment and sanitation, security, and intangibles such as
national cohesion and pride.
There are not very many ways for a
country to escape underdevelopment. There is a small group of countries
which
has in the last fifty or sixty years, through
human resourcefulness rather than God-given natural resources,
escaped poverty into middle income or even high income status. A look
at them should tell us much about the current prospects of West Africa.
For those countries without spectacular natural advantages,
such as massive amounts of oil or breathtaking tourist potential,
education and/or agriculture have been keys to success. For
Singapore,
the outstanding example,
catapulting itself in
less than two generations from third world to first world, and its
fellow Asian tigers, Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea, education was
more important. For countries like Brazil, world-leading exporter of
coffee,
sugar cane and soybeans, and Malaysia, world-leading exporter of rubber
and palm
oil, agricultural success laid the path to industrialization.
Realistically, the two ways by which West Africa could pull itself out
of its quagmire are through education and agriculture, linked to sound
government policy.
Educated people on average earn higher incomes than uneducated people,
especially in urban areas. This is a fact of life. If you educate your
citizenry they will find ways to make money for themselves,
irrespective of what their government is doing. The other potential
lifeline for West Africa is agricultural development. Even with an
academically weak
population, a cadre of productive, competitive farmers can do much to
boost a country’s living standards.
The
UN's
HDI has given us an idea of where West African nations rank in
education. How about agriculture, how does West Africa compare with the
rest of the world? With very large rural populations dependent on the
soil, this activity arguably is even more important to the region than
education. This should
be one activity where West Africa, with large amounts of fertile soil,
plenty of rainfall, plenty of sunshine and large rural populations,
this
above all should be the area
where West Africa comes into its own. Agricultural production and
productivity are key development indicators for West Africa not
specifically covered by the UN HDI.
How well does the West African farmer compare with his/her counterparts
around the world? The 2015 report Agricultural
Growth in West Africa,copublished
by the FAO, ECOWAS and African Development Bank, reveals a gloomy
picture despite its authors best efforts at optimism. The foreword
highlights a renewed attention to agriculture around the continent and
specifically in the ECOWAS region with "unprecedented opportunities
along with new challenges". The report argues that West African
countries have experienced sustained population and economic growth
over two decades resulting in "a rapid expansion of domestic and
regional food markets". Fair enough, we know that populations have been
growing, arguably too rapidly, and so the domestic demand for food has
been increasing. But how well have West African farmers been doing in
the global competition to
supply
these expanding markets? Excerpts (pages 11 - 13):
"West
Africa’s agricultural production
performance over the past 30 years has been mixed...Productivity growth
has been low and inconsistent. Agricultural growth in the region has
been driven largely by area expansion, whereas land and labour
productivity increases have been modest, with yields remaining well
below global benchmarks. This has been in sharp contrast to other
regions of the world, where yield increases have been the main drivers
of output expansion...While agricultural and food exports grew quickly,
imports grew even faster. Hence, only five West African countries
remained net agricultural and/or net food exporters over the period
2006-10...This increase in import dependence is mainly due to rapid
demand growth for rice and
wheat..."
The report proposes a veritable litany of reasons for this poor
performance by West Africa's farmers (pages 13 - 17):
"The
mixed overall performance of West
African Agriculture with respect to production and productivity and the
erosion of competitiveness are due to a host of structural
problems...Policy volatility and missing investments in critical public
goods...Underdeveloped roads and transport systems remain a key market
access constraint...Market infrastructure and wholesaling are
struggling to cope with demand growth...Unreliable electrical supplies
(a particularly severe problem in Nigeria) constrain the ability of
agroprocessors to operate their plants at capacity...Many value chains
are fragmented, with limited vertical and horizontal coordination among
different actors, including weak links with service providers...West
African farmers and other value chain actors generally lack access to
improved risk-management products and services...Insecure land tenure
and water rights undermine incentives to invest in land improvements
and irrigation and to attract outside capital into farming...Uneven
access to inputs, technologies and support services between men and
women constrains productivity growth...Low and inconsistent use of
improved inputs such as seeds, fertilizer, pesticides and veterinary
drugs remains the single most important proximate cause of low
productivity in West Africa...Fertilizer and equipment are mainly
imported, and farm-gate prices are high due to high transport and
distribution costs, small volumes, and sometimes inefficient government
tendering processes...Agricultural research systems are underfunded and
fragmented...Extension systems are frequently broken...Limited access
to and high costs of finance slow down investments and technology
adoption."
One is tempted to say if a critical failure requires 17 different
explanations (I skipped some) then perhaps the respondents are unsure
about
the real cause! I have long felt that the land tenure system in Sierra
Leone, which is particularly egregious in barring indigenes of the
capital from property rights in the rest of the country, is the most
important
contributor to the nation's woes. In its analysis of West African
agriculture, the FAO mentions land tenure, but as
just one of 17 separate problems. With productivity (output per unit
time and output per unit area) in West Africa generally lower than any
other region of the world, the West African farmer is consigned to
subsistence. The inevitable result is millions
of destitute economic
migrants showing up in citieswhich
can ill accommodate them, causing
a
host of additional problems, not least of which is how to
feed the
erstwhile farmers. With high birth rates and improved health care,
rural populations are expanding even in the face of overall
urbanization; this is a problem that gets steadily worse
with time not better!
The problem of low productivity compared to global benchmarks is one
that has bedevilled West African agriculture for decades.
It has
flummoxed the world's best and brightest. The
FAO, consultant to numerous Integrated Agricultural Development Plans,
the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the IMF, national
development assistance institutions such as DFID and USAID have advised
copiously, sometimes conflictingly, on the conundrum to little apparent
effect.
A
host of agencies, policies, plans and frameworks
have been devised over the years, including the ECOWAP, the CAADP, the
RAIP, the RAAF, the NAIP, the PCD-TASAN. The
2012 FAO publication, Why has Africa Become a Food Importer,
begins candidly,
"That
Africa has become a net importer of food and of agricultural products,
despite its vast agricultural potential, is puzzling...In 1980, Africa
had an almost balanced agricultural trade when both agricultural
exports and imports were at about USD 14 billion, but by 2007 its
agricultural imports exceeded agricultural exports by about USD 22
billion (FAOSTAT, 2011)."
I read with interest Deborah Brautigam's 1992 paper, Land Rights and Agricultural Development
in West Africa: A Case Study of Two Chinese Projects,
an analysis of two Chinese agricultural
assistance projects in the 1980s, one in Sierra Leone and one in
Gambia. The Chinese, the largest producers and consumers of rice in the
world, famously determined to showcase their methods to the West
African farmer in the hope of a lasting improvement in productivity.
The demonstration worked only for the duration of the Chinese stay. A
few years after they left, the projects had collapsed and the new
techniques had been abandoned. The author, sympathetic to customary
land tenure, sets out the economic arguments against it at
the outset and then seeks to cast doubt on these arguments, without
ever explaining her views on why West African agriculture performs so
poorly. Critical of management failings and especially keen to
highlight gender disparities, she apparently loses sight of the central
argument that she herself stated in her opening:
"Agricultural
development specialists have maintained for many years that the
traditional communal systems of land tenure in West Africa and other
areas are an obstacle to agricultural development. They argue that
people without secure title will not invest in the development of land,
since they cannot be assured access to it in future years and cannot
transfer it to their heirs; that transferable land titles are needed as
collateral for agricultural credit;..."
She proceeds to concentrate on the failings of the state, but the
fundamental debate is not about transferring communal land to the
state (even though this may sometimes be the only way to achieve the
ultimate objective). And simply recognizing and legitimizing customary
rights does not solve the problem outlined by Ms Brautigam
above. Customary, communal rights are
the problem. Because humans all over the world are selfish beings and
invest in themselves and their immediate family above their community.
The ultimate objective is to transfer land to the individuals
themselves. In
freehold. In perpetuity, for them and their assigns.